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This paper presents evidence regarding the post-earnings announcement drift
(PEAD) anomaly for the Greek market in the years 2000–2006 (covering earnings
announcements in the years 2001–2007). The impact of the introduction of Inter-
national Financial Reporting Standards on the size and prevalence of the PEAD
anomaly is examined. Unlike recent evidence for the US market we ﬁnd PEAD to be
alive and well, and of growing importance in our Greek sample. It may be the
adoption of international ﬁnancial reporting standards (IFRS) has served to reduce
earnings predictability in Greece and thus enhance PEAD in the Athens stock
exchange (ASE) market. This contrasts strongly with US evidence that the post-
earnings-announcement drift anomaly is now waning as more eﬃcient markets and
smarter, fundamentals-based, traders arbitrage its impact on stock prices.
Keywords: Post-earnings announcement drift; informational eﬃciency; emerging
markets; IFRS implementation.
1. Introduction
Post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is an anomaly \above suspicion"
according to Fama (1998). But we might ask is it particularly strong at times
when the market is spectacularly uncoupled from value or in markets that
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have particularly sparse information environments, where such a failure to
impound key indicators of value might be observed? This question leads us
to examine PEAD in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) in the ﬁnancial
years 2000–2006 (resulting in the earnings announcement dates in the years
2001–2007), a case-study that seems to ﬁt this description. So, this paper is a
case-study of an anomaly already well-documented amongst major centers of
ﬁnancial trading such as New York (Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990;
Bernard, 1993) and London (Liu et al., 2003). A study of the Cypriot market
was motivated by similar concerns and reported results rather similar to our
own (see Vafeas et al., 1998). Liu et al. (2012) present evidence of the eﬀect
of international ﬁnancial reporting standards (IFRS) compliance on the
value relevance of earnings in Peru. Here, we focus on the PEAD anomaly in
the Greek market in a era of radical accounting change and report a resur-
gence in PEAD compared to that observed in an immediately prior period.
Our results suggest PEAD may be reviving, in southern Europe at least, just
as reports of its death are being made in more developed markets, like the US
and UK. We link this revival to the process of IFRS implementation since
2005 and the resulting diminution of earnings-smoothing in favor of IFRS
which favors a more volatile earnings stream of the type produced by \fair
value" accounting and its requisite frequent asset revaluations.
2. Motivation and Context
2.1. The PEAD anomaly
Ever since PEAD’s ﬁrst arrival as a stock market anomaly (Ball and Brown,
1968) the inability of investors to adequately interpret earnings troubled
both academics and accounting reformers alike. An investment community
which proves incapable of interpreting earnings numbers is likely to exhibit
informational ineﬃciency more generally. For the US ﬁnancial market
Cohen et al. (2007) report a decline in the risk premium paid to trading on
earnings announcements after 1988, suggesting that various academic
papers pointing out the PEAD anomaly have served to stimulate arbitrage
to reduce its size. Such a decline in the risk-premia awarded for assuming
earnings-announcement day volatility in the stock price makes sense given
the much better disclosure environment of recent years with increased vol-
untary disclosure, earnings \guidance", including conference calls which are
often transmitted live and then posted on the Web. The Greek market may
provide an environment where limits exist upon eﬀective arbitrage and the
greater scale of \noise-trading" may allow such earnings-based pricing
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anomalies to continue to ﬂourish even as they wane in the most developed
centres of securities trading.
The Greek market in the years 2001–2007 certainly fulﬁls this require-
ment of a highly uncertain environment both with regard to what Greek
stocks were worth and how earnings might be used to infer their value. As
such the adoption of IFRS might be seen as a way to ameliorate information
uncertainty and hence reduce the strength of observed PEAD in the Greek
market. But, as we point out the nature of the transition to IFRS accounting
means the earnings of Greek companies have become more volatile, and less
predictable, inducing more marked PEAD in the ASE market.
2.2. Why Greece?
Karampinis and Hevas (2011) present evidence suggesting that the intro-
duction of IFRS has had limited impact on the informativeness of earnings in
the \unfavorable environment" of Greece. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) report
Greece ranks in the least transparent group on all three earnings quality
metrics they use, earnings aggressiveness, loss-avoidance and earnings
smoothing. Our study of PEAD thus focusses on Greece where casual em-
piricism suggests sentiment may have had a large role in equity prices during
a speculative market period. Prior research already suggests the Greek
market may be ineﬃcient in the weak-form sense (Dokery and Kavassanos,
1995). One aspect of this informational ineﬃciency may well concern the
processing of earnings information.
Greek companies appear to engage in some of the most extreme earnings
manipulation practices in the world. Leuz et al. (2003) argue that this
world-beating level of earnings management derives from high private
beneﬁts control, acquired under a legal regime where investor protection by
the law is weak. Dasilas and Leventis (2011) conﬁrm that the closely held
nature of ASE constituents means they have little need to signal value to
outside shareholders unrepresented on the Board. Our discussions with
market professionals in the Greek market conﬁrm minority shareholder
rights, especially in the face of an entrenched family interest, are weak.
Often the lack of eﬀective regulation to control insider trading appears to
induce slightly conspiratorial ambiance to the \Sophokleous Street" culture
in Athens.1 Bird et al. (2014) conﬁrms the role of market sentiment in
intensifying PEAD in the US markets and Kao (2007) provides evidence
1The term is Greek equivalent of Wall Street in the US.
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that unsophisticated investors are less able to detect the eﬀect of accruals
management on future earnings outcomes.
The informativeness and quality of earnings disclosure is not solely de-
termined by accounting standards alone, but by their enforcement which is
critical (Pope and McLeay, 2011). To adopt but not enforce is simply a form
of \psuedo-adoption" that investors often see through (Daske et al., 2008).
Verriest et al. (2013) present evidence that early and eﬀective compliance
is associated with good corporate governance that facilitates the enforce-
ment of high-quality disclosure. Well-governed companies make more and
higher quality disclosures, while political interference in the adoption pro-
cess tends to induce opportunistic usage of disclosures.
Greece has both a relatively poor record on corporate governance and a
long history of politicising both the structure and practice of the accounting
profession (Caramanis, 1999). This suggests a form of \psuedo-adoption" of
IFRS standards may well be the reality of Greek accounting practice. Florou
and Argiris (2007) present evidence on the poor quality of Greek corporate
governance against a variety of benchmarks. Greek companies have poor and
opaque corporate governance, especially when compared on an international
basis. So, earnings information is often evaluated within a poorer broader
institutional framework of corporate accountability in Greece.
Boonlert U-Thai et al. (2006) construct a sort of portmanteau metric of
\earnings quality" based on four separate, but related, properties of earnings
and the extent to which these properties can presage future cash-ﬂows and so
anticipate valuation changes. Greece ranks about 20th for accrual quality,
earnings persistence and earnings predictability in their earnings quality
ranking, but sixth for earnings smoothness, although the eﬀectiveness of
such smoothing is unclear (Wang, 2014).
This combination of relatively persistent earnings, which displays evi-
dence of some moderate smoothing, makes the Athens Exchange an inter-
esting one in which to examine PEAD and how its nature is changing over
time in response to what has been an era of fairly dramatic accounting
reform. Boonlert U-Thai et al. relate the earnings characteristics they study
to the degree to which a nation protects minority investors rights. Boonlert
U-Thai et al. place Greece in their third cluster as a codiﬁed (as opposed to
common) law system of French origin, alongside countries more typically
seen as still developing/emerging, as opposed to mainstream European
markets. Empirical work by Athianos et al. (2005) concerning the imple-
mentation of IFRS in Greece has conﬁrmed the impact of IFRS implemen-
tation in shifting the balance of ﬁnancial reporting from very conservatively
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reported earnings towards more of a \fair-value" balance sheet perspective
with all the earnings volatility that implies. The authors ﬁnd their results
are:
\consistent with Greek GAAP conservativeness and an in-
come smoothing orientation and with IAS’s fair value and
balance sheet orientation" (Athianos et al., 2005, p. 23).
This conservatism in reporting proﬁt reﬂects the historical link between
reported and taxable proﬁt under Greek GAAP. IFRS implementation
disrupts this historic settlement.
Related work by Vazakidis and Athianos (2010) chronicling IFRS com-
pliance, by a group of 90 companies traded on the ASE index in the years
2005–2006, show how ASE constituents reﬂect the greater volatility of
earnings, induced by \fair-value" revaluations of newly IFRS complaint
balance sheets, in their pricing behavior. Their study uncovers
\key diﬀerences between the old Greek conservative ac-
counting and the fair value accounting of IFRS using a
mixture of studies, the current paper has proved that the
switch of the accounting regime from Greek accounting to
IFRS has aﬀected the valuation of companies" (Vazakidis
and Athianos, 2010, p. 111).
It is this decline in the predictability of earnings, following the imple-
mentation of IFRS, that makes the Athenian market an interesting one
where IFRS may of increased the quality of earnings, but reduced their
predictability.
3. Research Method and Data Sources
The Athenian market is characterized by a number of informational ineﬃ-
ciencies which include
. larger transaction costs to trading, thicker bid–ask spreads and trading
commissions as well as taxes levied on trades and proﬁts made on them
(Phylaktis et al., 1999),
. insider trading and therefore \leakage" of information prior to the earnings
announcement date (Baralexis, 2008).
We study a sample of earnings announcements taken from the ﬁnancial years
2000–2006. This results in earnings announcement dates spread across
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months in early 2001 to early 2007. This is a sample period surrounding the
introduction of IFRS in 2005 and before the current sovereign debt crisis
took hold of the Greek economy, pushing all stock markets down.
3.1. Earnings surprises
We measure earnings \surprises" using two alternative metrics which are:
. A time–series benchmark based on deviations from last year’s earnings
value.
. A benchmark based on the deviation of reported earnings from the most
recent monthly consensus forecast of earnings.
So the earnings \surprise" (S) for the ith company in year t is deﬁned using
two benchmarks. The ﬁrst, the time-series benchmark, is simply
Si;t;k¼1 ¼
ðXt;i  Xt1;iÞ
Pt10;i
ð1Þ
and the second, the analysts’ forecasts benchmark, is given by
Si;t;k¼2 ¼
ðXt;i  Et1;i½Xt;iÞ
Pt10;i
; ð2Þ
where the two expectation formation models (k ¼ 1 or 2) of earnings (X),
denoted by the superscript on the expectation operator, are substituted
into the two alternative earnings surprise metrics, Et1;i½Xt;i is the con-
sensus forecast of next month’s earnings ﬁgure formed at t  1 and, ﬁnally
Pt10;i is the price of the ith stock 10 days prior to the earnings announce-
ment.
Earnings announcement dates for the Athens market were collected from
the Website of the ASE.2 There is no requirement for preliminary earnings
announcements to appear on newswire services, etc, so the date of publi-
cation of the accounts and the earnings-per-share ﬁgure are coincident in the
Athenian market.
3.2. Investor returns and abnormal return benchmarks
Measuring abnormal returns in an \event" study of PEAD is always a
controversial issue. In this, we follow a now well-established research method
attributable to Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999).
2http://www.ase.gr/content/gr/announcements/companiespress/.
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The abnormal share price performance metric employed is a buy-and-hold
return measure deﬁned as follows:
Rbhp;s;t ¼
Xns
i¼1
½Q sþt¼s ð1þ i;tÞ  1
ns
; ð3Þ
where ns is the number of companies in the portfolio with return Rp;s;t on the
day s over some horizon , where the portfolio return Rp;s;t is deﬁned over its
individual constituents abnormal returns i;t. To examine PEAD in our
sample we construct this metric for a sample of companies receiving good
and bad news about earnings as indicated by a chosen earnings benchmark.
We employ standard returns benchmarks. Initially, we use market-ad-
justed returns, Rit  rmt, deﬁning Rit to be the individual stock return and
rmt to be the daily return on the ASE index, as an alternative measure of i;t .
Second, we use the now fairly standard controls for risk outlined by Fama
and French (1993) in the form of their 3-factor model given by the equation
Rit  Rft ¼ i;t þ iðRmt  RftÞ þ siSMBt þ hiHMLt þ it; ð4Þ
where SMB is the monthly premia/discount payable to investing in shares in
the smallest sample size quartiles, when ranked by market capitalization, as
against the largest. HML is the premia/discount payable to companies in the
lowest market to book ratio quartile versus the highest. The usual CAPM/
SML market risk factor ðRmt  RftÞ remains in the model. Here, the constant
term i;t represents a measure of company under/out performance in each
period relative to the 3-factor benchmark, a sort of 3-factor Jensen’s .
4. Data
We study 520 earnings announcements drawn from 165 separate Greek
companies in ﬁscal years 2001–2007. Figure 1 gives a plot of the ASE index
for the years 2000–2007 and sets the context for later tests. There is a
clear point of recovery March 2003 onwards. We choose our starting point
deliberately to exclude the most wild excesses of the technology boom in
the period up until April 2000. Much of this positive sentiment arose
from the prospects of greater integration into the EU and speciﬁcally
membership of the Eurozone from the start of 2002.3 So, it can be hard to
disentangle stock market responses to IFRS adoption and broader market-
wide enthusiasm towards European membership in our sample period. For
this reason good benchmarking of asset returns is crucial.
3Greece qualiﬁed for membership in 2000, but was then admitted early in 2001.
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The sample ends as the ﬁrst shock waves of the recent ﬁnancial crisis were
being felt. As such the study captures the Greek market in a period of
relative tranquility between a dramatic boom and a later even more spec-
tacular bust.
Table 1 gives some summary statistics for some of the most basic data
entering our tests that is earnings-per-share changes and price responses to
those changes on the days following their announcement. As can be seen
earnings (per-share) changes show considerable losses with some large loss-
making companies entering our sample. But, the average earnings surprise
and the stock market response to those announcements is very small, re-
gardless of whether that response is measured over a 3 or 10-day period.
Fig. 1. ASE index over our sample period.
Table 1. Summary statistics for ASE sample 2001–2007.
Variable N Mean  Min Max
 actual EPS 520 0.075 1.079 19.73 9.96
Surprisets 227 0.003 0.128 0.570 1
Surprisefor 240 0.0004 0.005 0.031 0.023
Raw return 3-day (0,+3) pead 323 0.002 0.026 0.176 0.098
Raw return 10-day (0,+10) pead 322 0.005 0.032 0.187 0.102
Note: Surprisets is as constructed in Eq. (1) of text.
Surprisefor is as constructed in Eq. (2) of text.
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We use a short-window of three days ((0,+3), denoted pead+3 in ﬁgures)
and a longer window of two weeks or 10 trading days ((0,+10), denoted pead
+10 in ﬁgures), after the earnings announcement to capture the stock
market response to announced earnings. We use the two earnings surprise
benchmarks described above (see Eqs. (1) and (2)).
The data we use in the study windsorises both earnings surprises and price
changes at 100% of value. It is clear from both Table 1 and Fig. 2 that the
time-series earnings benchmark displays far greater dispersion. So, we focus
on the analysts’ forecasts benchmark (Surprisefor) when reporting our
results.
4.1. The joint distribution of price responses and earnings
surprises
Figures 2 and 3 present scatter plots for the two earnings surprise metrics
employed against a raw stock price buy and hold return for the three days
following the earnings announcement (0,+3). At such short windows the
controls used to capture risk matters far less unless we anticipate strong risk-
shifts clustered around the earnings announcement itself. Comparing Figs. 2
and 3, it becomes obvious the extent to which the relationship between 3-day
price responses and earnings surprises are inﬂuenced by outliers, even after
Fig. 2. Plot of earnings surprise versus 3-day PEAD using outstanding time-series
benchmark.
Note: The measure of stock performance used here is simply raw stock returns without any risk adjust-
ment for days (0,+3). The earnings surprise benchmark used here is the consensus analyst forecast
benchmark of Eq. (2) in text for Figs. 2 and 3, and the time-series benchmark of Eq. (1) in text.
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windsorizing surprises where the error in predicting earning-per-share
exceeds a 100% of price.4
While earnings surprises are usually almost zero, as a percentage of price,
on either measure the reliance on a few large surprises in absolute value is far
greater in the case of time-series earnings benchmarks in the Greek market.
Since macroeconomic conditions vary so much with the business cycle
Figs. 4 and 5 plot median and mean values for earnings surprises and price
responses, as measured by raw stock price buy and hold returns, across the
years of our sample using the longer 10-day window for raw returns and the
forecast-based earnings–surprise measure (pead(0,+10) against Eq. (2)’s
metric, denoted Surprisefor). Examining both plots the volatility of response
to earning–surprises across yearly sub-samples is very clear.
Regardless of the measure of central tendency in returns used the 2002
average price response to announced earnings is strongly negative, sug-
gesting a far higher earnings ﬁgure than that announced in that year was
expected. Perhaps this indicates the presence of some sort of \earnings bath"
taken prior to the need to backward reconcile accounts under IFRS in
4We windsorize data points to hold earnings surprises at 100% of the absolute value of the
current price-earnings ratio.
Fig. 3. Plot of earnings surprise versus 3-day PEAD using outstanding analyst forecast
benchmark.
Note: The measure of stock performance used here is simply raw stock returns without any risk adjust-
ment for days (0,+3). The earnings surprise benchmark used here is the consensus analyst forecast
benchmark of Eq. (2) in text for Fig. 3 and the time-series benchmark of Eq. (1) in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 5. Figure mean 10-day CAR to earnings surprise using Surp for measure of earnings
surprise.
Note: The earnings surprise benchmark used here is the consensus analyst forecast benchmark of Eq. (2)
in text. In Fig. 4, the measure of stock performance used is simply the median raw stock returns for days
(0,+10) and the comparable mean calculation in Fig. 5.
Fig. 4. Figure median 10-day CAR to earnings surprise using Surp for measure of earnings
surprise.
Note: The earnings surprise benchmark used here is the consensus analyst forecast benchmark of Eq. (2)
in text. In Fig. 4, the measure of stock performance used is simply the median raw stock returns for days
(0,+10) and the comparable mean calculation in Fig. 5.
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anticipation of ﬁnal IFRS compliance in 2005. For both mean and median
returns there is a clear shift to investor optimism about earnings around
2003, which accords with the revived fortunes of the Athens index plotted in
Fig. 1. Li and Huang (2013) conﬁrm that managerial optimism intensiﬁes the
practice of earnings management using a sample of Taiwanese companies. It
is clear something fairly dramatic happened to earnings expectations, and
market responses to their fulﬁlment or otherwise, in the period following
2003. It is likely that this structural break also impacted on recorded PEAD
in Greece.
The most obvious motivation for this change in earnings transparency
was the implementation of IFRS by Greece at that time. The Olympic
Games were also scheduled to arrive in Athens, its original home, in 2004.
While IFRS was only adopted by EU states on the 1st January 2005, the EU
also required backward reconciliation of published accounts for two years.
So, our sample brackets a major market reversal reﬂecting both EU mem-
bership and the adoption of IFRS standards more speciﬁcally.
5. Evidence of PEAD in Greece
Figure 6 gives an initial impression of the scale of observed PEAD in our
Greek sample once we split sample ﬁrms into good and bad news about
earnings portfolios, pooling all sample year observations, and initially using
Fig. 6. PEAD in ASE for whole sample with market-adjusted return benchmark.
Note: PEAD over the whole sample period using the market-adjusted return, calculated according to the
buy and hold metric. The earnings surprise benchmark used here is the consensus analyst forecast
benchmark of Eq. (2) in text.
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just the buy and hold market-adjusted returns to capture the market re-
sponse to an earnings surprise. Here, earnings surprises are measured by the
deviation of the consensus forecast of earning-per-share issued in the pre-
vious month and the announced value (Surprisefor, the benchmark given in
Eq. (2). We present our results for an event window of minus 10 days to plus
10 days. Clear evidence exists of earnings anticipation, amongst both the
good and bad news portfolios, but little overall drift is present. The buy and
hold return plots of the good and bad news portfolios do however diverge
substantially in the 10 days following the earnings announcement.
The Athens exchange market is itself an institution undergoing huge
transformation in these years and averaging over the whole of our sample
period may be unwise as Figs. 4 and 5 suggest.
Comparing the pre-and post-IFRS regime the concentration of PEAD in
the period after IFRS were introduced is striking. After the introduction of
IFRS the gap between good and bad news portfolio returns is both large and
clearly present, even 10 days after the earnings announcement.
The gap between good and bad news portfolios is consistently large and
invariant around the earnings announcement before or after IFRS’s intro-
duction. But, before the introduction of IFRS the separation of good and
bad news about earnings portfolios largely evaporates just before the
earnings announcement date. Earnings anticipation post IFRS seems to
have not greatly changed, but the market impact of an earnings an-
nouncement itself seems to have been greatly enhanced by the introduction
of IFRS, at least when we use the buy and hold market-adjusted return
benchmark for returns as a performance benchmark. This reﬂects the di-
minished predictability of earnings following the implementation of IFRS,
which reduced the conservatism of reported earnings in Greece, and the
greater volatility of earnings induced by \fair-value" revaluations of sample
companies’ balance sheets.
5.1. Regression based tests
Perhaps the most standard test of PEAD in the market-based literature are
regressions of stock market responses upon earnings surprise metrics. Of
course such tests suggest a linearity and normality of distribution our data
do not have (even after the removal of outliers). Nevertheless to make our
work comparable with that of major prior studies of PEAD we present such
regression results in Table 2. This table presents results for a regression of
investor returns in the 10 days following an earning-announcement (0,+10),
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adjusted by the average return to ﬁrms in the same size quartile, employing
the analysts’ forecast based earnings-surprise metric, Surprisefor (as given by
Eq. (2)).
The regression conﬁrms the weak evidence of PEAD’s presence during our
whole sample period, but also shows strong evidence of its clustering in the
post-IFRS period. Note that while the post-IFRS coeﬃcient on the earnings
surprise is strongly signiﬁcant its size is small, suggesting the ability to
proﬁtably trade on this anomaly may be somewhat constrained given the
size of spreads in the Athenian market.
5.2. PEAD with Fama–French 3-factor controls
The Fama–French benchmark has now become the standard technology for
controlling for company diﬀerences (see Fama and French, 1993). Ken
French’s excellent web page provides estimates of the relevant \risk" factors
for many countries in Europe and elsewhere. Sadly, factors for the Greek
market are not downloadable from French’s website. So, we construct our
own estimates here for the ASE based on size and market to book quartiles.
We take the average return on the smallest quartile of stocks quoted on the
ASE, by market capitalization in each prior year’s July, from that of the
largest to yield our size factor, small minus big (SMB). We take the average
return on the lowest market-to-book quartile of stocks (i.e., those facing the
Table 2. PEAD regression using 10 day buy and hold
abnormal returns using equivalent size-quartile benchmark.
Variable Coeﬃcient White t-Value N R-Squared
Whole period 2000–2006
Surprisefor 0.0033 0.002 300 0.003
Constant 0.0003 0.9
Pre IFRS 2000–2004
Surprisefor 0.002 0.7 184 0.0001
Constant 0.0008 0.15
Post IFRS 2005–2006
Surprisefor 0.003 6.12 116 0.054
Constant 0.002 0.41
Note:
Rit  Rs;t ¼ þ ½Ei;t1½Xit   Xit ;
where Ri;t is the return on the ith stock at t, Rs;t is the return
on an average stock in the same size quartile in time t, Ei;t1
½Xit  is the forecast of earnings, Xi;t, at month t formed a
month before.
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Fig. 7. PEAD in ASE pre IFRS using market adjusted benchmark.
Note: PEAD over the whole sample period using the market-adjusted return, calculated according to the
buy and hold metric. The earnings surprise benchmark used here is the consensus analyst forecast
benchmark of Eq. (2) in text.
Fig. 8. PEAD in ASE post-IFRS period using market-adjusted return benchmark.
Note: This ﬁgure PEAD over the post-IFRS period using the market-adjusted return benchmark using a
buy and hold metric. The earnings surprise benchmark used here is the consensus analyst forecast
benchmark of Eq. (2) in text.
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highest liquidation risk) quoted on the ASE, ranked in the July of the pre-
vious year, from the average return on the highest market-to-book quartile
(facing the least liquidation risk) to yield our value factor, high minus low
(HML). The resulting estimates of PEAD, relative to this 3-factor bench-
mark, are reproduced in Figs. 9–11. Given the sharper deﬁnition of PEAD
we uncover using this benchmark we extend the observation window to 30
days either side of the earnings announcement day.
Fig. 9. PEAD in ASE for whole sample using Fama–French benchmark.
Note: This ﬁgure PEAD over the whole sample period using the Fama–French 3-factor benchmark of
Eq. (4) using the buy and hold return metric of Eq. (3).
Fig. 10. PEAD in ASE pre-IFRS using the Fama–French benchmark.
Note: PEAD over the pre-IFRS and post-IFRS period using the Fama–French 3-factor benchmark of
Eq. (4) using the buy and hold return metric of Eq. (3) The earnings-surprise benchmark used here is the
consensus analyst forecast benchmark of Eq. (2) in the text.
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As with the previous benchmarks we ﬁnd some evidence of PEAD in the
Greek market in our overall sample, but ﬁnd it to be far more sharply deﬁned
in the post-IFRS period, 2005–2006. Once again investor anticipation of the
earnings announcement seems strong both before and after the introduction
of IFRS. This suggests the \earnings surprise" we study may not be that
surprising to the market at all because insiders have anticipated it in their
trades.
6. Conclusions
The results of our paper conﬁrm the presence of PEAD in the Greek market
and suggest its scale intensiﬁed after the introduction of IFRS in 2005,
although most Greek companies issued IFRS compliant ﬁnancial accounts
from 2003 onwards. A factor clearly undermining these conclusions is the
strong presence of earnings anticipation in the data, suggesting the earnings
announcement may not be hugely surprising to most market professionals
for the average company. Nevertheless our tests, using a wide-range of
benchmarks for both abnormal returns and earnings surprises suggest PEAD
is alive, well and growing of late in the Greek market. Our somewhat
counterintuitive conclusion is that the introduction of IFRS into the Athens
market in 2005 sharpened the presence and persistence of observed PEAD in
that market.
Fig. 11. PEAD in ASE post-IFRS period using Fama–French benchmark.
Note: PEAD over the pre-IFRS and post-IFRS period using the Fama–French 3-factor benchmark of
Eq. (4) using the buy and hold return metric of Eq. (3) The earnings-surprise benchmark used here is the
consensus analyst forecast benchmark of Eq. (2) in the text.
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While the ﬁnding that IFRS has reduced the informational eﬃciency of
the Greek equity market at ﬁrst seems anomalous it does reﬂect some of the
practicality of IFRS reform. While before IFRS Greek GAAP was highly
conservative and largely devoted to minimizing taxable proﬁt this all
changed with the implementation of IFRS. Compliance required the appli-
cation of \fair-value" asset revaluations in an era of surging stock markets in
Athens. This made earnings both less conservative and crucially far less
predictable prior to their announcement. In this context, PEAD was able to
grow as investors struggled to interpret the meaning of freshly IFRS com-
plaint earnings.
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